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During the first week of December, the U.S. President convened the heads of state of Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo for a peace agreement. The commitment involved an end to long-standing fighting in the volatile eastern DRC, framing it as an opportunity for businesses in all three nations “to make a lot of money”.

Not long after, however, a sharply contrasting approach to conflict emerged. It was declared that U.S. forces had conducted Christmas Day airstrikes in north-west Nigeria, striking sites linked to the Islamic State (IS). Via a statement posted online, the President declared, I had cautioned these Terrorists that if they did not stop the slaughtering of Christians, there would be hell to pay, and tonight, there was.”

A Defining Change of Direction

This contrast exemplifies the defining tenet of the U.S. engagement with sub-Saharan Africa in this period: a de-emphasis from promoting democracy and human rights in favor of a stated focus on economic deals and conflict resolution—even as this fits with the emerging aerial operations in Nigeria is an open question.

“Our view has shifted from Africa as a continent in need of handouts, but as a capable commercial partner. ‘Trade, not aid,’ a mantra we’ve seen thrown around for years, is now truly our policy for Africa,” declared a senior U.S. state department official during a visit to Côte d’Ivoire in March.

A White House representative stated this, noting the President “approaches Africa not as a charity case, but as a powerhouse partner. Under his leadership, American capital, technology, and diplomacy are helping African nations secure peace, build real energy independence, and turn their natural wealth into jobs and opportunity.”

Strategic Results and Contradictions

This pivot is significant, but analysts note it is early to gauge its impact. The approach is complicated by the President’s unconventional diplomacy, which has included disputes with long-standing U.S. partners and negative rhetoric towards Africans.

“The core tenet is, if it’s in the long-term or short-term interest of the United States, as I see it, then I’m going to do it,” explained an analyst for Africa studies at a influential foreign policy council.

Key decisions have included:

• Dismantlement of the primary U.S. international development agency, USAID. An analysis forecasts this could lead to millions of preventable deaths globally by 2030, with a significant portion in Africa.
• Imposing visa restrictions on citizens from numerous African countries and halting most refugee admissions.
• Unleashing a global tariff campaign that has adversely affected African businesses dependent on U.S. markets, such as textile manufacturers in Lesotho.
• Allowing a longstanding U.S.-Africa trade preference act, the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), to lapse without renewal.

International Disinterest and Tensions

Unlike his recent predecessors, the President avoided sub-Saharan Africa during his first term. His most infamous engagement with African affairs was referring to nations on the continent with a crude epithet, which he later admitted using.

“Africa clearly runs dead bottom in his list of priorities, not just for the President, but for the administration in general,” said the Africa program director for an international conflict resolution organization. He pointed to the recent U.S. National Security Strategy, which devoted only three paragraphs to Africa in a 29-page document.

A notable dispute has erupted with South Africa, seemingly spurred by claims of persecution against the white minority. This led to a U.S. boycott of the G20 summit in Johannesburg and threats to block South African delegates from the next meeting.

“The idea of a ‘white genocide’ happening in South Africa resonates strongly now with U.S. political culture and the idea that diversity is not welcome, it’s a threat,” observed a veteran South African journalist based in Washington.

Quid Pro Quo Diplomacy and Conditional Involvement

A comparable tension emerged with Nigeria in November, when the President threatened to cut aid and send in the military “guns-a-blazing” over the killing of Christians. This ran up against Nigeria’s complex reality as a nation composed between Christians and Muslims and suffering from security crises affecting both groups.

Some Nigerian analysts noted that the stern rhetoric may have pushed the government into increased efforts on security. After the Christmas airstrikes, Nigerian officials said they had approved the U.S. intervention and might collaborate on further actions.

Trump has made no secret his desire for a Nobel Peace Prize. His administration has brokered in the Congo conflict and sent an envoy to try to negotiate a resolution in Sudan’s civil war, to date without success. While the Congo deal appeared to have been broken quickly, it “at least serves to introduce a degree of diplomacy and a channel outside the battlefield,” argued one conflict expert.

Similar to Other Powers

Some analysts see the new U.S. approach as similar to that of global rivals like Russia and China, who have expanded their involvement in Africa in recent decades based on strategic interests.

“It’s a long overdue recognition of African agency, and to that extent, it represents, at least at the level of symbols, taking Africa very seriously,” commented one foreign policy analyst.

Realistically, the revised strategy likely means that “an African country that doesn’t have anything to put on the table … is not on his radar.”

“The engagement that we are talking about is not aimed at spreading the milk of human kindness, as it were, it is about a transactional posture towards Africa,” the journalist concluded.